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Several factors that scholars have thought relate to the duration of civil war including: 
low per capita income, ethnic divisions, resources/contraband, and terrain were found to have no 
correlation to the duration of civil war. Another factor that scholars have suggested relates to the 
duration of civil war is rebel group strength.  It has been found that a rebel group with weak 
military capacity may prolong a civil war. Weak rebel groups use irregular tactics and an 
irregular tactic that a weak rebel group may use is terrorist attacks. The contribution of this thesis 
is that it analyzes a variable that few scholars have looked at which is tactics, specifically 
terrorist attacks, to see whether or not terrorist attacks are related to the duration of civil war. The 
findings suggest that the number of terror attacks relates to the duration of civil war.  A high 
































From 1975 to 2007 there have been approximately 156 civil wars that have caused 
economic turmoil and have taken countless lives in countries around the world. The duration of 
civil war varies from country to country and scholars are unsure as to what factors increase the 
duration of civil war. Literature suggests that the duration of civil war may be longer when a 
rebel group is weak. It is also suggested that a weak rebel group may use the tactic of terror 
attacks. This thesis seeks to tie the two areas of research together by quantitatively and 
qualitatively researching the relationship between terror attacks and the duration of civil war.  
 Peru is an example of a country that experienced a long lasting civil war. The civil war, 
according to the Correlates of War database, lasted ten years and six months. During that time, 
70,000 people died. While researching about the conflict in English, the conflict is always 
referred to as civil war. In contrast, in Lima, Peru the conflict was never referred to as civil war, 
but rather terrorism. On the other hand, in the highlands town of Ayacucho, Peru, the conflict 
was referred to as an internal war. Ayacucho is where the rebel/terrorist group Sendero 
Luminoso (Shining Path) began. The region experienced intense fighting between the Shining 
Path and the military.  The Shining Path sought to overthrow the government and control the 
state. Learning about the conflict in Peru, is what really started me thinking about how terrorist 
attacks and civil wars, especially those in which rebel groups are vying for control of the central 
government, may relate to one another.  
Some civil wars last longer than others and there is no clear consensus as to how 
terrorism plays a role in duration.  This is related to the general literature on civil war duration. A 
plethora of factors have been studied to determine the influences on duration of civil wars. Some 
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scholars have suggested that per capita income influences duration (Collier, 2004). Some have 
suggested that certain types of terrain may relate to the duration of civil war (DeRouen and 
Sobek, 2004). Other scholars have researched whether or not the strength of the rebel group may 
influence the duration (Buhaug et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2009). 
Even though all sorts of variables that may influence the duration of civil war have been 
analyzed, one possible factor that few scholars have researched in detail is the relationship 
between tactics and the duration of civil war. Tactics may vary from group to group and they 
may also vary during a conflict.  Indeed, one tactic that may be used by a weak rebel group is 
terrorist attacks.  
This paper adds to the research on the duration of civil war and factors that may influence 
duration. It looks at tactics specifically terrorist attacks. This paper seeks to answer the question: 
Is there a relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and the duration of civil war?  
I approach this question by building on the theory that the duration of civil war is related 
to weak military capacity. In this case, weak military capacity is explored as a type of tactic, 
specifically terrorist attacks. The data I use is primarily from the Correlates of War database and 
the Global Terrorism Database.  I also adopt a mixed methods approach for the analysis. The 
quantitative methodology will be used to analyze the cases and the methods used are descriptive 
statistics and statistical analysis.  A qualitative case study will also be done on one of the 
outliers.  
This research paper proceeds as follows. Section one is a literature review which 
examines several factors that are thought to relate to the duration of civil war including: low per 
capita income, ethnic divisions, resources/contraband, terrain, and the strength of the rebel 
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group. The contribution of this thesis is that it analyzes a variable that few scholars have looked 
at which is tactics, specifically terrorist attacks, to see whether or not terrorist attacks are related 
to the duration of civil war. Section two, the theory portion of the paper, introduces the weak 
rebel theory. The weak rebel theory is based on findings that suggest a rebel group with weak 
military capacity may relate to a long duration of civil war. Weak rebel groups use irregular 
tactics. An irregular tactic that a weak rebel group may use is terrorist attacks. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that there is a relationship between terrorist attacks and duration of civil war. In 
section three, the reader will find the research design. Section four shares the data analysis. The 
results of the study find that there is a moderate, positive relationship between the number of 
terrorist attacks and the duration of civil war. The data analysis also shows that the condition of 
terrorist attacks is a sufficient condition for prolonged duration. This means that if there are a 
high number of terrorist attacks there is a long duration of civil war, but not all civil wars with a 
long duration have a high number of terrorist attacks. The data analysis also contains an in depth 
case study of Peru. Finally, the paper is tied together in the conclusion which reiterates the key 
findings. None of the previously suggested variables: low per capita income, ethnic divisions, or 
mountainous terrain are found to relate to the duration of civil war in this study. There is a 
relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and the duration of civil war. A high number 
of terrorist attacks was found to be a sufficient condition, but not a necessary condition for a 
prolonged civil war. 
Literature Review  
 
While it is apparent that some civil wars last longer than others, it is unclear as to why the 
duration varies. Key variables that scholars suggest influence the duration of civil war include: 
lower per capita income, ethnic divisions, resources/contraband, terrain, and the strength of the 
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rebel group.  Scholars have been looking for what conditions are necessary to explain the 
prolonged duration of civil war. Instead of finding necessary conditions, so far what scholars 
have found is several sufficient conditions. This means that if the condition (variable) is present 
there will be a long duration of civil war, but there may also be a long duration of civil war even 
if the condition is not present. One condition that few scholars have analyzed is whether or not 
tactics, specifically the tactic of terrorist attacks, relates to the duration of civil war.  
 
One factor that is thought to relate to an increased duration of civil war is low per capita 
income. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Måns Söderbom (2004) find that low per capita income 
in a country is related to an increased duration of civil war. They found that “a 10% increase in 
per capita income is associated with a 5% reduction in the duration of conflict” (Collier et al., 
2004). This is because a higher per capita income is associated with higher opportunity costs for 
the society due to conflict (Collier et al., 2004). So, a lower per capita income would mean that 
opportunity costs are lower and it may make it easier and less expensive to recruit people to join 
the rebel cause. On the other hand, James Fearon (2004) suggests there is no relationship 
between a nation’s income level and civil war.  
Another possible factor that has been suggested as influencing duration is ethnic 
divisions.  Paul Collier et al. (2004) found that moderate ethnic fractionalization may play a role 
in the increased duration of civil war. It has also been found that ethnic wars tend to last longer 
(DeRouen and Sobek, 2004). It is suggested that ethnic wars are harder to resolve. 
The influence that natural resources have on the duration of civil war is not so clear and 
there have been varied findings. Ross (2004) suggests that gemstones, coca, opium and cannabis 
seem to lengthen civil war. He finds that oil, on the other hand, is not linked to conflict duration.  
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Fearon (2004) also finds that contraband which may include gems, coca, and opium may make 
for longer civil wars.  However, Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) find that gemstones and 
petroleum do have a relationship with the duration of civil war, but drugs do not relate to the 
duration of the conflict. In terms of natural resources and which relate to the duration of civil 
war, it seems that the results are inconclusive. Gemstones, drugs and petroleum have all been 
found to relate to the increased duration of civil war by at least one scholar.  
Another area that has been hypothesized to play a role in influencing civil war duration is 
terrain.  The focus on terrain may have been inspired by Che Guevara’s quotation about terrain 
that is favorable to guerrilla warfare. He wrote, “Guerrilla fighting will not always take place in 
country most favorable to the employment of its tactics; but when it does, that is, when the 
guerrilla band is located in zones difficult to reach, either because of dense forests, steep 
mountains, impassable deserts or marshes, the general tactics, based on the fundamental 
postulates of guerrilla warfare, must always be the same” (Hendrix, 2011, p. 345). Scholars have 
found differing results in regards to the role that terrain may play in the duration of civil war. 
DeRouen and Sobek (2004) suggest that mountainous terrain offers a cover that usually helps 
rebels. Forest cover was not necessarily found to help rebels defeat the state, but it was found to 
increase the probability of a prolonged duration (DeRouen and Sobek, 2004). Collier et al. 
(2004) found that neither mountainous terrain nor forest coverage were significant. They suggest 
that if the rebels were able to become strong enough to be involved in a conflict that became a 
civil war it could be continued militarily without the need for favorable geography. Thus, there is 
no clear consensus as to whether or not terrain increases duration of civil war. 
The duration of civil war may also relate to another possible factor which is the strength 
of the rebel group. Buhaug et al. (2009)  suggest that conflicts in which the rebels have weak 
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military capacity tend to last longer. Along the same lines, Collier et al. (2004) suggest that 
increased external military support for rebels shortens conflicts. This is because the increased 
external military support would mean that the rebels no longer have weak military capacity and 
thus the rebels are more equal in capacity to the state. This equality or near equality in military 
capacity often leads to negotiations (Hultquist, 2013). These studies find that the strength of a 
rebel group relates to the duration of civil war. 
A factor that may help a weak rebel group is the location of the rebel group’s stronghold. 
It is suggested that the distance from the center of government may correlate to increased civil 
war duration (Fearon, 2004; Buhaug et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2009). Conflicts that are 
closer to the border of the country may also relate to increased civil war duration.  To 
summarize, location may influence duration of civil war in conflicts where the rebel group is 
located far from the center of government and close to the border of the country.  
However, these factors examine national level characteristics and how the characteristics 
may relate to duration. Another body of civil war research focuses on analyzing the dyadic 
relationship between rebel group and state to determine how duration may be influenced.   
Civil wars often start with a weak rebel group challenging the stronger state. In most 
cases in comparison to the state the rebel group lacks legitimacy and military capabilities 
(Clayton, 2013).  There is also usually a large asymmetry in relative power between the rebel 
group and the state even when the state is considered to be a weak state (Hultquist, 2013). Due to 
their lack of military capabilities and legitimacy, the rebels have difficulty defeating the state at 
any point, but if the rebels make it through the first months their chance of winning increases and 
if the state does not achieve a quick victory the chance of government victory decreases (De 
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Rouen and Sobek, 2004). Rebels may appear to be significantly weaker than the state but as a 
conflict continues the chances of the state defeating the rebels decreases (Cunningham et al, 
2005). Mason, Weingarten, Fett (1999) also, found that the government has less of a chance of 
overcoming the rebels as time progresses, but they added that this is not necessarily in favor of 
the rebels. They found that, “As conflicts become protracted, the most likely outcome is not a 
victory by either side but, instead, a negotiated settlement” (Mason et al., 1999, p. 264). 
Although the state wants to quickly defeat the rebels, using too strong of an army in an attempt 
to quickly defeat even a very weak rebel group could increase the duration of the war because 
the weak rebel group has the option of going into hiding (DeRoeun and Sobek, 2004).   
The rebels may hide amongst the civilian population, in mountainous regions, or in 
forests and jungles. Hiding serves multiple purposes. For rebels with weak military capacity who 
do not engage in direct attacks, hiding makes it more difficult for the government to identify and 
target rebels. It can also increase recruitment for the rebels if the state military is overly zealous 
and indiscriminate and ends up killing civilians in attempts to target and eliminate rebels (Butler 
and Gates, 2009). If the rebels are able to become stronger and form a larger rebel group they 
would not be able to hide as easily nor would they want to because the goal would be to 
concentrate people in order to attempt to defeat the state military (Butler and Gates, 2009). Once 
the rebel group has been able to gain enough strength to attack the state military through means 
of conventional warfare the state may be willing to enter into negotiations (Clayton, 2013). 
Attacking the state military by means of conventional warfare shows that the rebel group is near 
parity with the state. In civil wars, this parity often leads to a settlement (Hultquist, 2013).  
Occasionally, rebel groups will become stronger than the state. When a rebel group has become 
stronger than the state it is unlikely that the group would be willing to settle or negotiate with the 
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state because the rebel group believes it would lose power in relation to the state (Hultquist, 
2013).  This scenario of the rebel group becoming more powerful than the state tends to be rare.  
In most cases, a rebel group is weaker than the government military and too weak to 
directly attack the state, so it will attempt to hurt the state in ways that avoid direct encounters 
with the military (Hultman, 2007). As Hultquist states, “The hit-and-run tactics associated with 
the weak rebels, such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare, allow them to avoid direct conflict with 
the government forces and build military strength for a later period…” (Hultquist, 2013, p. 625). 
This suggests that weak rebels engaged in irregular or asymmetric warfare tend to use terrorist 
tactics.  
This leads to the final factor which may relate to the strength of the rebel group which is 
tactics. Few scholars have looked at the types of tactics used by rebel groups during civil war. In 
terms of guerrilla warfare, Che Guevara wrote in the above quotation that the tactics must always 
be the same. But, perhaps this is not the case;  although, as Ethan Beuno de Mesquita (2013) 
points out most scholars (with a few notable exceptions) have tended to treat rebel tactics in 
isolation of one another. He explains that the literature and theory on guerrilla warfare, terrorism, 
insurgency, conventional war fighting, etc. have all been separate from one another.  
When looking at warfare, tactics are not always the same from conflict to conflict nor do 
they necessarily remain the same throughout a conflict.  Mesquita (2013) suggests that rebels 
have two types of available tactics which they choose strategically in response to varying factors 
such as geographic and military constraints to name a few. Mesquita (2013) refers to the tactics 
as conventional and irregular. He suggests that when the rebels have a large number of fighters 
conventional tactics are most effective. In contrast, the irregular tactics such as terrorism or 
guerrilla attacks can be effective when used by even small groups.  He later goes on to add that 
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when the rebel group is perceived as too weak to attract support, which would make 
conventional tactics a viable option, the rebels then turn to irregular tactics (Mesquita, 2013). 
This ties in with the Buhaug et al. (2009) theory on the rebel military capacity and the duration 
of civil war. If a rebel group has weak military capacity, then the group will most likely use 
irregular tactics. And, as Mesquita (2013) wrote, one tactic that weak rebel groups can use is 
terrorist attacks. This research takes this logic one step further and aims to find out whether or 
not the irregular tactic of terrorist attacks may relate to an increased duration of civil war.  
While all of the above factors may influence the duration of civil war, when looking at 
the different studies, it becomes apparent that there is no general consensus and researchers have 
differing results. For instance, in regards to low per capita income as mentioned above, although 
Paul Collier et al. (2004) find that lower per capita income effects duration, that is low income is 
a sufficient, but not necessary condition for long duration of civil wars. However, other scholars 
find different results.  For example, in 2009, Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, Paivi Lujala 
conducted research that found a weaker correlation between low per capita income and duration.  
And, James Fearon (2004) suggested that per capita income is insignificant to the duration of 
civil war that is it is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for long duration of civil wars. 
So, in regards to the how per capita income relates to duration some researchers have found that 
there is an influence, while others have found that there is no influence.  
Data and Definitions 
How is it that so many scholars studying the same variables may come up with different 
results and conclusions? As Geddes (1990) suggests, the answer to the research question depends 
upon the cases that are chosen. Yet, the cases that are chosen often depend upon the available 
data, as well as the criteria that are used for inclusion.  In the case of civil war research, scholars 
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use a small set of databases.  Nicholas Sambanis (2004) writes that “most civil war lists rely 
heavily on the Correlates of War (COW) project” (p. 814). Another popular dataset is the 
UCPD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. It includes conflicts that are defined as “a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between 
two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths” (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, p. 1). It seems that many researchers 
choose one of the two above datasets and then modify and create his/her unique dataset. 
Determining how exactly a researcher created his/her dataset can get a bit confusing. Sambanis 
has eleven coding rules that are used to identify what is or is not a case of civil war and when the 
case started and ended. He thoroughly explores the variations in civil war definitions and the 
differing ways to determine start and end dates for civil wars (Sambanis, 2004).  
Thus, as established above, the Correlates of War is a reliable data set. The Correlates of 
War database defines intrastate war as a war that involves sustained combat, involving organized 
armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve 
month period. The Correlates of War database further subdivides intra-state wars into three 
types. Civil war is one of the types. Civil wars involve the government of the state against a non-
state entity. From here, different criteria may be chosen as to which cases/countries are to be 
included in the study. For instance, this may be limited by the years that are chosen for the study. 
It may also be limited by which criteria for civil war are used.  
There are different ways to divide civil wars into subsets. Buhaug (2006) suggests that 
“distinguishing between territorial and governmental conflicts provides additional insights into 
the correlates of civil war” (p. 706). Conveniently, in the Correlates of War database, the civil 
wars are divided into those that are for control of the central government and those that are over 
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local issues. This research will focus on those that are for government control. These categories 
are further divided into those that did or did not have international intervention. In this research, 
only the civil wars that did not have international intervention will be included because 
intervention changes the dynamics of the civil war. It has been found that conflicts with more 
actors tend to have a longer duration (Cunningham, 2006).  
Defining civil war and duration is relatively clear-cut in comparison to definitions of 
terror or terrorist attacks. It has been said that few political terms have been as difficult to define 
(McCormick, 2003; Weinberg, et al. 2004; Stohl, 2007). There is an inability within the 
international community as well as amongst governments and scholars to establish a single 
definition for terrorism.  Gordon McCormick explains that interest in studying terrorism began in 
the early 1970s. Decades later there has been little progress in establishing one all-encompassing, 
agreed upon definition for terrorism. He elaborates by saying, “[T]errorism has remained a 
contentious field of inquiry. One of the most controversial aspects of the subject involves its 
definition” (McCormick, 2003, p. 473). Michael Stohl (2007) adds, “Given the political context 
in which terrorism occurs it is not surprising that governments would have trouble agreeing upon 
a definition but scholars have also failed to consistently define (and thus as a consequence 
delimit) the behavior and thus the actors, organizations and events that should be included in the 
study of terror, terrorism, and terrorists” (p. 259). When attempting to search for the definition of 
terrorism, newcomers to the field soon realize that there is not one agreed upon definition for 
terrorism. It seems that international organizations, governments, news agencies/journalists, and 
scholars all define terrorism in different ways.   
Yet, while many believe it is impossible to agree upon a definition of terrorism, others 
believe that terrorism must have a set definition so they go about trying to define terrorism.  
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Boaz Ganor (2002) said, “An objective definition of terrorism is not only possible; it is also 
indispensable to any serious attempts to combat terrorism” (p. 288).  He adds that it is not 
enough for individuals “to say that what looks like a terrorist, sounds like a terrorist, and behaves 
like a terrorist is a terrorist” (Ganor, 2002, p. 287). Boaz Ganor and Alex Schmid look to 
international law to help define terrorism.  Ganor (2002) says, “A correct and objective definition 
of terrorism can be based upon accepted international laws and principles regarding what 
behaviors are permitted in conventional wars between nations. These laws are set out in the 
Geneva and Hague Conventions which in turn are based upon the basic principle that the 
deliberate harming of soldiers during wartime is a necessary evil, and thus permissible, whereas 
the deliberate targeting of civilians is absolutely forbidden.” (p. 288) International law focuses 
on the distinction between civilian and combatant. Schmid (2004) explains, “Most of 
contemporary terrorism is not a fight against the armed forces of an opponent; rather it is 
‘designed’ chiefly against civilian targets who ordinarily, according to the rules of land warfare, 
enjoy immunity from deliberate attack” (p. 204).  This definition of terrorism looks at who is 
targeted in order to define terrorism.  
While looking at who is targeted is one way to define terrorism, others think this 
definition does not include many of the important elements of terrorism and is too simplistic. 
Walter Laqueur has said, “Too much has been made, in my opinion, of the element of 
‘noncombatant targets’ in order to define terrorism” (Laqueur, 2007, p. 20).  There are many 
more elements that may be used to define terrorism.  
Walter Laqueur, a terrorism scholar, does not find it surprising that it is so difficult to 
define terrorism but rather believes it is impossible to create one definition for terrorism. He has 
said, “No all-embracing definition will ever be found for the simple reason that there is not one 
13 
 
terrorism, but there have been many terrorisms, greatly differing in time and space, in 
motivation, and in manifestations and aims” (Laqueur, 2007, p. 20).  Like Walter Laqueur, many 
agree that terrorism cannot be described or classified with a single definition, but nevertheless 
many continue to attempt to define terrorism. 
And thus, since some semblance of a definition is needed for this research, a look back 
through history will help provide the basis for how terrorism is defined as a tactic. Charles Tilly 
explains the origins of the word terror. He writes, “The word terror itself first entered the West’s 
political vocabulary as a name for French revolutionaries’ actions against their domestic enemies 
in 1793 and 1794.” (Tilly, 2004, p. 8). At that time, terror referred to the government use of 
terror and repression mainly through executions (Tilly, 2004). Approximately fifty years later, 
one of the first written justifications for the use of terrorism by a revolutionary group was penned 
by the radical German publicist Karl Heinzen (McCormick, 2003). He wrote in 1849 which was 
the year after the Communist Manifesto had been published and it was during the start of the 
revolutionary outbreak in Europe. Karl Heinzen wrote an essay explaining the importance of 
terrorism as a tactic (p. 475). In the essay he wrote that he was in agreement that killing is 
immoral; but he argued that in the context of a murderous tyrannical regime murder is self-
defense. He wrote that in order to fight against an immoral, murderous tyranny “revolutionaries 
must turn their weakness into a political strength by pursuing an offsetting strategy of high-
profile violence” (McCormick, 2003, p. 475). In other words, terrorism is a violent strategy or 
tactic that may be used by the weak non-state actor.  This simple definition will be used as the 
basis for the conceptual definition of terrorism. As Martha Crenshaw said, “The observation that 
terrorism is a weapon of the weak is hackneyed but apt” (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 387) 
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Going back to the saying that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” 
succinctly summarizes why terrorism is so hard to define. It is often defined in terms of the 
individual and there tends to be an emotional debate surrounding who is or is not a terrorist. 
Following in line with researcher, Jakana Thomas (2014), this paper circumvents the debate of 
who is and who is not a terrorist by focusing on the tactic rather than the individual.  Thomas 
looks to the definitions and reasoning’s of the researchers Tilly and Lake as to why it is 
justifiable to assert that as Thomas summarized, “any actor can employ terror” (Thomas, 2014, 
p.2 ). And while any actor can employ terror as a tactic, terror attacks by the state are now often 
renamed as possibly genocide or crimes against humanity and thus fall outside of the area of 
research for this study. Only terror attacks by rebel groups are analyzed in this paper.  
Ironically, the scholarship on terrorism and civil war rarely overlap. Sanchez-Cuenca and 
de la Calle (2009) write, “The focus on international terrorism is unfortunate” (p. 32). This is 
because as they say, “Domestic terrorism represents by far the greatest part of all terrorist 
violence” (p. 32). And, terrorism usually, but not always, takes place during political conflicts 
(Schmid, 2004). With these two ideas in mind that terrorism is predominately domestic and that 
domestic terrorism takes place during conflicts one can see that terrorism or terror attacks can 
take place during civil war.  
In the past decade, there has been a growing interest in seeing how the two fields of study 
relate. Some recent researchers have begun to see how important it is to study the fields together 
(Findley and Young, 2012; Stanton, 2013; Thomas, 2014). Findley and Young (2012) write, 
“Most current research on these topics either explicitly or implicitly separates the two, in spite of 
compelling reasons to consider them together…we examine the extent to which terrorism and 
civil war overlap and then unpack various temporal and spatial patterns” ( p. 285). They do this 
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by coding geographic coordinates for the terrorist attacks that are in the Global Terrorism 
Database. They then map the attacks to see how they relate to civil wars in countries. Their data 
shows “a high degree of overlap between terrorism and ongoing civil war…” (Findley and 
Young, 2012, p. 285). Findley and Young through their geo-referencing are able to show that 
terror attacks occur during civil war.   Stanton (2013) states, “Although scholars have focused 
primarily on transnational terrorism, much of the terrorism occurring worldwide is domestic 
terrorism carried out by rebel groups fighting in civil wars” (p. 1009).  
What are the outcomes when rebel groups use terror attacks during civil war? Fortna 
(2011) specifically looks at the outcomes of civil wars when rebels use terror attacks.
1
  She notes 
that terrorists do not win civil wars and she finds that civil wars last longer when terrorism is 
involved (Fortna, 2011). Her study first attempts to identify whether or not a rebel group should 
be classified as terrorist or not terrorist. Her study also differs in that she uses the Cunningham, 
Gleditsch, and Salehyan dataset (the UPCD/PRIO dataset) rather than the Correlates of War 
dataset.  
This study does not try to identify a rebel group as terrorist or not terrorist. It assumes 
that any actor can employ terror attacks as a strategy. And, it seeks to find the relationship 
between the numbers of terror attacks that a rebel group uses during a civil war and the duration 
of civil war. This thesis relies on the Global Terrorism Database for the operational definition of 
terrorism as well as for calculating the number of terror attacks in a country. From 1970 to 1997 
the Global Terrorism Database defined terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force 
and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political economic, religious or social goal through 
fear, coercion, or intimidation” (Global Terrorism Database). The definition of terrorism from 
                                                          
1
 She did not publish her paper or results but a draft version was available online. 
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1998 to 2007 became slightly more nuanced. It is still conceived as “an intentional act of 
violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor” but it also had to meet two of three criteria 
which include: “the violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social 
goal; the violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some 
message to a larger audience (or audiences) rather than the immediate victims; and the violent 
act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law” (Global Terrorism Database). 
The database was used for the number of individual terror attacks that have occurred 
domestically within a country. The attacks were then added together for the duration of the civil 
war to see if there is a correlation between the number of attacks and the duration of civil war.  
Thomas (2014) also uses the Global Terrorism Database.  Her study finds that in civil 
war in Africa, “rebel groups are more likely to be granted the opportunity to participate in 
negotiations and offered more concessions when they execute a greater number of terror attacks 
during civil wars” (Thomas, 2014, p. 1). These results seem to differ from Fortna (2011) in that 
negotiations and concessions; although not an outright victory for a rebel group, also do not seem 
to be a loss for a rebel group as Fortna found. Fortna’s findings also suggested that the duration 
is longer in civil wars in which rebel groups use terror attacks, but Thomas’s study suggests that 
within months of terror attacks negotiations and concessions may follow (Thomas, 2014). The 
different findings may be due to the fact that only African civil wars are tested, but Thomas 
writes that “there is no reason to expect the results will not hold outside of the region” (Thomas, 
2014, p. 13). Yet, there is a chance that the results may vary if other regions are included in the 
study. Africa may be different than other parts of the world in terms of civil war outcome and 
duration. For instance, some studies have shown that civil wars in Africa are harder for 
governments to win and tend to last longer (DeRouen and Sobek, 2004).  
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This leads back to the idea that there is a lot of variation in the way that a researcher 
chooses data and definitions. Many factors that may influence the duration of civil war such as: 
low per capita income, ethnic fractionalization, terrain, access to natural resources or contraband 
and the strength of a rebel group have all been suggested to have an effect on duration. This 
study seeks to contribute to this existing body of research by looking at a specific tactic which is 
terror attacks that a weak rebel group may use. In doing so, the fields of civil war research and 
terrorism research are being combined. In the past, due to lack of data as well as debates in 
regards to definitions, few scholars have studied terror attacks and the relation that the attacks 
may have on the duration of civil war.  Now that data is available through the Global Terrorism 
Database it is possible to do a quantitative study.  This thesis contributes to the field by helping 
to fill a gap in the literature between terror attacks and civil war duration. Specifically, the 
contribution of this thesis is that it will quantitatively calculate the total number of terror attacks 
that occur during a civil war, which is fought for control of the central government and has no 
international intervention, to see if there is a relationship between the number of terror attacks 





While several theories have been proposed suggesting different factors that may relate to 
duration of civil war, this research seeks to add to the theory that there is a relationship between 
the strength of a rebel group and the duration of civil war.  In 2009, Halvard Buhaug, Scott 
Gates, and Paivi Lujala (2009) suggested that conflicts in which rebels have weak military 
capacity tend to last longer.  
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This study builds on the theory of weak rebels and irregular tactics. Mesquita suggests 
that weak rebel groups will resort to irregular tactics such as terrorism.  This is because a rebel 
group that is too weak to directly attack the state military will attempt to attack the state in ways 
that avoid direct encounters with the military (Hultman, 2007). As Hultquist (2013) says, “The 
hit-and-run tactics associated with the weak rebels, such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare, allow 
them to avoid direct conflict with the government forces…” (p. 625).  If this is tied in with the 
Buhaug et al. (2009) suggestion that conflicts in which rebels have weak military capacity tend 
to last longer; it may be assumed that conflicts in which weak rebels use the tactic of terrorist 
attacks may last longer. This may be referred to as the weak rebel theory.  One implication of the 
weak rebel theory is that the tactic that a weak rebel group may choose to use, in this case 
specifically terrorist tactics, influences the duration of the civil war.   
The hypothesis is that there is a relationship between the number of terrorist attacks in a 
country during a civil war and the duration of the civil war.  Given the complexity of the civil 
war and terrorist attacks, the hypothesis is testing correlation rather than a direct test of 
causation. This is because even in the literature, the direction of causation between number of 
terrorist attacks and duration of civil war is unclear.   
 
 
Research Design  
 
 
While many factors may influence the duration of civil war, the theory that is guiding this 
research is that weak military capacity is related to an increased duration of civil war.  Since 
weak military capacity is being conceptualized as a specific type of irregular tactic, terrorist 
attacks, the assumption is that terrorist attacks will relate to duration of civil war.  
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The key dependent variable is civil war duration. The generally agreed upon definition of 
civil war is that the conflict is an intra-state war that results in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related 
fatalities per year.  Civil wars are a type of intra-state war that involves the government of a state 
and a rebel group (a non-state entity). Countries included are those categorized in the Correlates 
of War database as civil wars that were fought for control of the central government. Civil wars 
that were fought over local issues were not included in the study. The literature suggests that 
rebel groups fighting for control of the central government tend to use a wide range of tactics to 
achieve their desired goal.  Also, only civil wars that did not have international intervention were 
included. The duration of the civil war was considered to be the length of time that the civil war 
lasted in months as recorded by the Correlates of War database. 
 The key independent variable is terrorist attacks. How best to define terrorism is an 
ongoing debate, but this study adopts Thomas’s (2014) definition that considers terrorist attacks 
to be a tactic and thus are viable options for any actor. The Global Terrorism Database is the first 
comprehensive database to collect data on domestic terrorist attacks. It does not include terrorist 
acts which are known to be committed by the state.  
Other independent variables include other factors that may influence the duration of civil 
war. These variables include the per capita income of a country and ethnic fractionalization. 
Ethnic divisions may be formed in a country based on a common racial, linguistic, religious, 
tribal, or cultural origin/background. These ethnic divisions may cause ethnic fractionalization.  
Natural resources and terrain also may play a role in civil war duration. Also, for this study 
terrain is conceptualized as the percentage of mountainous terrain.  
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The data collected and analyzed is quantitative. For the key dependent variable, the 
duration of civil war, the Correlates of War database is being used. The civil wars included in the 
study range in starting date from 1975 to 2007. They are civil wars that are fought against a rebel 
group for control of the state government and there is no international intervention. In total, 42 
cases were selected from the Correlates of War database. Many of the countries had more than 
one civil war during the time period included in the study. The duration was calculated from the 
Correlates of War database in months.  
Data from the Global Terrorism Database was used for the key independent variable. The 
number of terrorist attacks per month that a country experienced during the duration of its civil 
war were added together to give the total number of terrorist attacks. Data for the Global 
Terrorism Database began being collected in 1970, but it was not considered to be very thorough 
until 1975. This is why the civil wars included in the study are from 1975 onward.  
Another independent variable that is included in the study is per capita income. This data 
comes from the World Bank. The data was presented in the GDP per capita in US dollars. For 
each country, the GDP per capita in US dollars was found and recorded for the first year of the 
conflict.   
For the independent variables of ethnic division and the percentage of mountainous 
terrain the operational definitions were established by James Fearon and David Laitin (2003). 
This is because their data was used and replicated for these two variables in this study. Ethnic 
fractionalization in their study was defined based on only one dimension which was 
ethnolinguistic groups. They conceptualized it as the chance that individuals selected at random 
would be of the same ethnolinguistic group.  Calculating the percent of mountainous terrain is a 
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difficult task which is explained in more detail by Fearon and Laitin.  A number of scholars 
studying civil war tend to use the Fearon and Laitin (2003) variables.   
The data used in this study are both primary and secondary sources. The data includes 
data from: the Fearon and Laitin dataset (2003), the World Bank, the Global Terrorism Database, 
and the Correlates of War Database. The years included in the study are limited to the data 
available in Global Terrorism Database and then matched with the Correlates of War. The 
Global Terrorism Database began in 1970, but the year of 1975 was chosen as the start year for 
this study for the cases/countries selected because before this time data in the Global Terrorism 
Database was thought to be less thorough and comprehensive. The latest date for the start of a 
civil war in the current Correlates of War database is 2007. In total 42 cases were selected based 
on the dates of 1975 to 2007. Five cases had no terrorism data so they were eliminated from the 
study. This left a total of 37 cases. The research was limited to a certain extent by the secondary 
data that was available.  
The methodology used is quantitative and qualitative with 37 county level cases in the 
study. One of the outliers, Peru, is chosen as an in-depth a case study to explain the process and 
how weak rebels use terrorist attacks.  The methods are descriptive statistics and statistical tests 





 The data set has 37 cases that only include the wars that were fought for governmental 
control and did not have international intervention between 1975 and 2007. Figure 1 shows the 
total number of terrorist attacks that each country experienced during the duration of its civil 
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war. The two outliers in Figure 1 are El Salvador and Peru. Peru and El Salvador each 
experienced more than five-thousand terrorist attacks during the time the country was engaged in 
a civil war. According to the Global Terrorism Database, after all terrorist attacks were summed 
during the time the country was engaged in civil war there were 5,425 terrorist attacks. El 
Salvador experienced 5,020 attacks. There were only three other countries that experienced over 
one-thousand terrorist attacks. They were Algeria, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Sri Lanka also 


















































































































































































































Figure1. Number of Terrorist Attacks per Country                  
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The cases of El Salvador and Peru were removed from the majority of the descriptive and 
statistical analysis so they would not skew the results. Peru, since it had the highest number of 
terrorist attacks of any country, and this is the choice for the in-depth case study.  
Figure 2 displays the duration in months of each civil war experienced in a particular 
country. The graph shows that Sudan, which experienced a civil war lasting 245 months or 
approximately 20 years, is an outlier. The other two outliers El Salvador and Peru, which were 
identified in the previous graph based on the very high number of terrorist attacks they 
experienced, also had very long lasting civil wars. The civil war in El Salvador lasted 151 
months and the civil war in Peru lasted 126 months. There were three other countries that 
experienced a very long duration of civil war. The war in Afghanistan lasted 128 months. 
Nicaragua experienced a civil war lasting 97 months. And, the war in Algeria was 88 months.  
As mentioned previously, the two outliers due to the very high number of terrorist attacks of El 
Salvador and Peru are being removed from the descriptive and statistical analysis so they do not 
have a strong effect on the correlation. And, Sudan with its very long duration of civil war is also 
being removed which leaves 34 cases in the following analysis portions (unless otherwise 
mentioned and noted). In order to see graphs with the outliers removed for the total number of 

















































































































































































































Figure 2. Duration in Months per Country 
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Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics.   The average duration in months was 32 
months.  The duration range is 3 months in Rwanda in 1994 and the civil war in Syria to 128 
months for the civil war in Afghanistan. 
The average number of terrorist attacks in a country was 204 attacks. The standard 
deviation is 387 attacks and this is more than the mean number of attacks that indicates the 
existence of extreme outliers in the data set. As one can see, there is a wide range in the number 
of attacks ranging from a minimum of one attack to a maximum of 1,399 attacks. The civil war 
in Uganda had one attack as well as the civil war in Chad in 1998. The civil war that started in 
Nicaragua in 1982 had 1,399 attacks.  
The average number of people wounded by terrorist attacks in a civil war was 532 
people. The standard deviation was 1066 which means that there a few cases that are 
significantly influencing this variable. The minimum number of people wounded in the attacks 
was zero. The civil wars in Congo, Liberia, Uganda, and Chad in 1998 had no people wounded 
in the terrorist attacks that occurred in the countries during the civil war. The country that 
experienced the most wounded people from terrorist attacks during the country’s civil war was 


















Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Duration in Months 32 22 31 3 128 
Number of Terrorist Attacks 204 49 387 1 1399 
Number Wounded in Attacks 532 124 1066 0 5721 
Per Capita Income in US $ 678 404 647 73 2314 
 Source: Global Terrorism Database, Correlates of War, World Bank. N=34 
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 Figure 3 shows the bivariate analysis of duration and the number of terrorist attacks (also 
see the appendix).  As the number of terrorist attacks increases the general trend is that the 
duration in months also increases. The correlation between duration and the number of terrorist 
attacks is .59. But, as the figure shows it appears there are a few cases that have significantly 
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Table 2 shows the correlations between the number of terrorist attacks and duration. The 
correlation coefficient is 0.59. This is a positive, moderately strong relationship between the 
variables. Another variable that showed a positive, moderately strong relationship with the 
duration is the number of people wounded. The correlation coefficient was 0.50. The variables of 
mountainous terrain and ethnic fractionalization have no relationship with the duration of the 
civil war. The per capita income in a country and the duration of civil war had a correlation 
coefficient of -.0210. This means that the relationship is negative but not significant.  This table 
shows that the strongest correlation between any of the variables was between the number of 































Table 2. Correlations  
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Correlation Coefficient 
Number of Terrorist Attacks Duration 0.59 
Number Wounded Duration 0.50 
Mountainous Terrain Duration 0.01 
Ethnic Fractionalization Duration 0.07 
Per Capita Income Duration -0.02 
 Source: Global Terrorism Database, Correlates of War, World Bank, Fearon and Laitin data set. N=34 
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After looking at the data analysis one sees that there is a moderate, positive relationship 
between the number of terrorist attacks and the duration of civil war. The data supports the 
hypothesis that the duration of civil war varies with the number of terrorist attacks.  As 
suggested, rebel groups that have weak military capacity tend to use terrorist attacks as a tactic to 
prolong the civil war.   
The data results for the other factors differ from the results of other researchers. None of 
the other proposed factors which were suggested to influence duration by other researchers were 
found to relate to civil war duration. The results did not support Collier et al. (2004) finding that 
low per capita income may lengthen the duration of civil war. This study suggests that there is no 
relationship between per capita income and duration of civil war.  
Other independent variables that were analyzed also showed no relationship to the 
dependent variable. For instance, the results did not support Fearon’s (2004) suggestion that 
ethnic fractionalization may increase the duration of civil war. Based on this analysis, there was 
no relationship between ethnic fractionalization and duration of civil war. There was also no 
relationship found between the percentage of mountainous terrain and the duration of civil war.  
This research contributes to the existing field of research by analyzing tactics specifically 
the tactic of terrorist attacks which is a factor that few other scholars have analyzed. The results 
of the bivariate analysis suggest that there is a relationship between the number of terrorist 
attacks and the duration of civil war.  
While the correlation suggests that there is a positive, moderately strong correlation 
between duration and the number of terrorist attacks, it is important to keep in mind that 
correlation does not mean causation. The data results suggest a grouping of the civil wars into 
four categories. The first is short duration and a low number of attacks, second is short duration 
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and a high number of attacks, third long duration and a low number of attacks, and finally long 
duration and a high number of attacks. 
Table 3 includes all of the cases. Thus, the average for the duration and the number of 
attacks was recalculated to reflect all 37 cases. The average duration for all civil wars was 43 
months. If the duration of a civil war in a particular country was 43 months or less, it was 
considered to be a short civil war. If the duration of a civil war in a country was 44 months or 
more, it was considered to be a long duration.  
The average number of terrorist attacks was also calculated. The average was 468 attacks. 
If the country had 468 or fewer attacks, it was placed in the low attack group. If it had 469 or 

















Source: Global Terrorism Database, Correlates of War   
 
 
    Duration  
 Short 
43 months or less 
Long 
44 months or more  



















































In Table 3, the category with the most cases was the one that consisted of civil wars in 
countries that were of a short duration with a low number of attacks. This category contained 24 
of the 37 cases in the study. The next category of a long duration and a low number of attacks 
contained 7 cases. There are no cases in the category for a short duration and high number of 
attacks. The other 6 cases fit into the long duration and high number of attacks category. Sri 
Lanka has an asterisk beside it because the Correlates of War dataset coded the civil war as 
lasting for 29 months, but in reality it lasted for approximately 30 years.  Sri Lanka, Guatemala, 
Algeria, Nicaragua, Peru and El Salvador were the six cases in the study that had a high number 
of attacks and a long duration.  
 The vast majority, 24 out of the 37 cases, had a short duration and a low number of 
attacks. So, from this analysis it can be said that civil wars that had a short duration had a low 
number of attacks. This does not mean that all civil wars in the study with a low number of 
attacks had a short duration because there were seven cases of a low number of terror attacks and 
a long duration. Interestingly, though there were no cases for a high number of terror attacks and 
a short duration. To reiterate not all countries that had a long duration of civil war had a high 
number of terrorist attacks, but all countries that experienced a high number of attacks during 
civil war had a long duration of civil war. Therefore, it seems like a high number of terror attacks 
is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for a prolonged civil war.  
 To reiterate, this study found that a high number of terrorist attacks are a sufficient 
condition for a prolonged civil war. This means that when there are a high number of attacks 
during a civil war there will be a long duration. But, a high number of terrorist attacks is not a 
necessary condition, because there can be a prolonged civil war even when a high number of 
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terrorist attacks is not present. So, in several countries there was a long duration even though 
there were a low number of terrorist attacks. The figure below shows this relationship. 
Figure 4. Sufficient Condition 
High Number of Terrorist Attacks  Long Duration 
Low Number of Terrorist Attacks  Long Duration 
 
This relationship between a high number of terror attacks and a long duration will be 
explored more thoroughly in the case study of Peru, which had the highest number of terrorist 
attacks, 5,425, of any case in the study. Other variables that have been shown to increase 
duration but where shown to have no correlation to duration in this study will also be explored.  
The case study will seek to explore the weak rebel group theory in more detail by 
specifically focusing on one weak rebel group; the Shining Path. An in-depth case study is 
necessary in order to understand how the mechanism of terrorist attacks is associated with the 
duration of civil war and how the tactic of terrorism was used by this weak rebel group. The case 
study will also reveal some of the other causal mechanisms since the quantitative portion only 
explored correlation.  
Terror and Conflict in Peru 
The high number of terrorist attacks in Peru during its civil war made it an extreme 
outlier which is why it was chosen for a case study. This case study will explore how the weak 
rebel group, the Shining Path, used terror attacks as a strategy in hopes of ultimately 
overthrowing the Peruvian government. As shown above, a high number of terror attacks is a 
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sufficient condition for a long duration. But, civil wars are complicated and messy and this case 
study shows that in the case of Peru several other factors which past researchers have suggested 
that may relate to civil war are present.  
The armed struggle in Peru began on May 17
th
, 1980, which was the eve of the first 
democratic elections in Peru since 1963. Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL)- the Shining Path, burned 
ballot boxes to symbolize the beginning of the war against the Peruvian state (Gorriti, 1999).  
The act that was meant to declare the start of the armed struggled of the Shining Path against the 
state was noticed by few since it occurred in a tiny village in the Ayacucho region of Peru which 
is one of the poorest regions and its located high in the Andes Mountains far from the coastal 
capital city of Lima.  
It is not a surprise that the first symbolic act of the civil war was overlooked because 
throughout the conflict the severity of the conflict was often underestimated since the revolution 
was strategically started in the countryside with the goal of eventually reaching and taking over 
the cities. Articles from the mid- 1990s estimated that the total number of people who died 
during the conflict was approximately 30,000 people. But, in 2003, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission reported that more than double that number or approximately 70,000 individuals 
died during the conflict. Peru is an interesting case because many people in Peru, especially in 
Lima, still refer to the conflict as terrorism and not a civil war. But, the articles in English refer 
to the conflict as a civil war because a conflict in which 70,000 people die far exceeds the 
threshold for the number of casualties per year that is one of the defining factors of civil war. 
The case of Peru is an example of a country in which terrorist attacks were used as a strategy, 
one of the main strategies, in the case of the Shining Path, to try to wage and win a civil war.  
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Another reason why Peru should be considered a civil war with terrorist attacks is due to 
the fact that to call the conflict terrorism and not terrorism in the context of civil war seems to 
negate that two sides were responsible for the deaths of nearly 70,000 people in Peru. And those 
two sides were the Shining Path and the military of Peru.  The commission concluded that the 
Shining Path was responsible for 54% of the deaths during the conflict or the murdering of 
37,000 people. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) was responsible for killing 
approximately 1,000 people (the MRTA will not be further addressed in this thesis since they are 
not considered one of the active groups in the civil war). The other 31,000 people or 45.5% of 
the deaths were committed by the police, army, navy, or armed peasant militias.  
The Communist Party of Peru- Shining Path had been planning the armed struggle for 
nearly a decade before it finally acted. Its emergence can be traced back to mid-1960s, when a 
Maoist faction split from the Communist Party (Degregori, 1991; McCormick, 1987).   Abimael 
Guzman, the founder of the Shining Path and a philosophy professor at Huamanga University, 
later formed another splinter group, the Shining Path. He did so due to the unwillingness of the 
other groups to “take up arms against the Peruvian government” (Starn, 1995). According to 
Orin Starn, Huamanga University, which is located in Ayacucho, reopened at the same time as 
the escalation of radical politics in Peruvian universities. One university student commented that 
the universities were ‘temples to Mao Zedong’ (Starn, 1995, p. 403). Beginning in 1971 when 
Guzman became personnel director at Huamanga University, Guzman was able to use the 
“temple” to his advantage by hiring faculty with similar ideology who then recruited and 
indoctrinated students who would become members of the Shining Path (McCormick, 1987). 
The Shining Path “offered the seductive promise of an active role in an imminent ‘world 
proletarian revolution’ under the wise guidance of a charismatic leader who seemed to speak in 
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the omniscient, almost magical, voice of scientific truth” (Starn, 1995, p.405). Abimael Guzman 
believed and was able to convince his followers that with the communist ideology and through 
the military doctrine of Mao Zedong that armed struggle could lead to radical change. Ivan 
Hinojosa (1998) writes, “It was hard to believe, moreover, that a handful of fanatic followers of 
Mao, armed with “humble dynamite” (in Guzman’s words), would have any chance against the 
solid, modernized army Velasco had built” (p. 77). The Shining Path is an example of how much 
terror and destruction can be wrought if there is a leader with a very strong and compelling 
ideology even when the group has a weak military capacity. 
The conflict was an ideological conflict for control of the government, but ethnicity also 
played a role in the conflict. Interestingly, Orin Starn (1995) says that “despite claims of radical 
upheaval, the new party’s internal organization replicated the colonial stratification of regional 
society: a privileged elite of white professionals commanded a mass of brown-skinned youth of 
humble origin” (p. 405). In Peru, often times the indigenous, rural labors were dark skinned 
while the individuals living in cities that had the privilege of higher levels of education often 
times had lighter skin. Many frustrated young indigenous people joined the Shining Path along 
with idealistic college students. After the conflict ended the TRC found that 79% of the people 
killed lived in rural areas and 75% of the people who died during the conflict spoke Quechua or a 
native language other than Spanish. According to the TRC this shows, “[T]he veiled racism or 
scornful attitudes that persist in Peruvian society almost two centuries after its birth as a 
Republic”.  So, even though the conflict was not considered an ethnic conflict ethnicity still 
played a role in the conflict.   
After graduating from Huamanga University, many of the early Shining Path members 
became school teachers throughout the regions of Ayacucho and Apurimac. In addition to 
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working as schoolteachers, many Shining Path members throughout the late 1970s began to enter 
very rural and isolated areas in order to take over the towns by forcibly removing state officials, 
capitalists, and large landowners (Kent, 1993). The Shining Path was beginning to establish a 
widespread presence in Ayacucho and parts of Apurimac.  
In the first few years of the 1980s, the people in the villages in Ayacucho and Apurimac, 
who were mostly indigenous rural agricultural laborers, supported or at least accepted the 
Shining Path. Even though the movement was spreading, the government was slow to respond to 
the Shining Path for many reasons including that they misjudged the attacks in Ayacucho and 
they figured they were insignificant works of a handful of criminals and thus left the problem to 
be solved by the local police rather than the military (McCormick, 1990).  The police forces were 
caught off guard and unprepared to counter the Shining Path. They attempted to confront the 
Shining Path but they were unsuccessful due to a lack of coordination, plans and equipment. This 
led the population in the regions that were being overtaken by Shining Path to reject the police 
forces and the government. It wasn’t until 1981 that 1400 hundred members of the Peruvian 
Civil Guard were dispatched and the army finally sent 2000 troops to put down the insurgency in 
December of 1982 (McCormick, 1990). The government counterinsurgency was ruthless.  
The military responded to the Shining Path with extreme brutality. Individuals who were 
thought to be Shining Path members or collaborators were tortured, murdered or they 
disappeared.  The people in the villages had few options because if the villagers did not support 
the Shining Path, they were killed by the Shining Path by “macabre means-often by stoning or 
slitting throats to heighten fear and save bullets” (Starn, 1995, p. 561). According to the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, out of the entire conflict the most people were killed in 1983. 
The TRC reported, “These were caused by the PCP-SL’s assassination campaigns and the bloody 
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official response, which according to the TRC’s calculations left 19, 468 victim fatalities, or 28 
percent of the total estimated for the entire internal armed conflict. These casualties went almost 
unnoticed by the rest of the country, due to the serious ethnic divisions in our society”. The Truth 
and Reconciliation Committee also found that the Popular Action party, which was the 
governing party at the time, ignored reports of massacres and human rights abuses because the 
party hoped that the brutality would lead to a short conflict. Eradicating Shining Path in any way 
possible was of more importance than protecting the lives of citizens in remote regions like 
Ayacucho.  
The violent counterinsurgency which led to tens of thousands of deaths and massive 
human rights violations was unable to eliminate the Shining Path, but the military was able to 
successfully prevent the Shining Path from establishing territorial control in the highlands 
regions of Ayacucho and Apurimac (Kent, 1993).  But, the state’s brutality had unintended 
consequences in that it caused the villagers to side more with the Shining Path than the state. As 
Carlos Ivan Degregori (1998) writes, “…upon unleashing a genocidal violence, the Armed 
Forces converted the countryside of Ayacucho into an Armageddon. In many instances, this 
made Shining Path appear as the ‘lesser evil’” (p. 142).  In addition, the Shining Path had already 
begun to expand its operations north and south throughout the Central Andes and northeast into 
the jungle region in the Upper Huallaga Valley. By moving into the Upper Huallaga Valley, the 
Shining Path was able to put itself in a location where it was able to form ties with local coca 
growers and extract profits. 
The Upper Huallaga Valley is the main coca growing region in Peru. In 1983 Peru 
became the world’s leading exporter of cocaine paste and the product which is used in cocaine 
made up approximately 70 percent of the world market (Kay, 1999). The Upper Huallaga Valley 
42 
 
was an “organizational no-man’s land in the 1980s” and this power vacuum led to drug 
traffickers controlling the area with bribes, coercion, and death threats (Kay, 1999). The Shining 
Path was able to enter the valley and form a relationship with the local population by becoming 
allies with the locals against the drug traffickers and against governmental forces that were trying 
to eradicate coca. Since the Shining Path was able to establish order, they gained territorial 
control through the support of the locals and they were able to set up a base of more than a 
thousand militants (Kay, 1999). This territorial control also allowed them to have access to a 
substantial amount of money. They taxed the coca growers for protection and they forced drug 
pilots to pay landing fees estimated anywhere from $3,000 to $10,000 per flight (Kay, 1999). It 
is unknown how much money the Shining Path brought in but it is estimated between $20 
million and $250 million (Kay, 1999). It is not certain what all of the drug funds were used for 
but it is thought that the money allowed the Shining Path to finance operations, pay salaries to 
the militants and to purchase arms that weren’t acquired through other means (Kay, 1999). 
The rebel group remained relatively weak throughout the conflict, and the Shining Path 
often relied on stealing weapons. Guzman was quoted as saying that the Shining Path “is waging 
the most economical war on earth”.  He went on to say, “The enemy has the weapons, 
consequently, the problem is to wrest them from him…They have an obligation to give them to 
us… And we have to admit they are starting to deliver” (McCormick, 1990, p.23). Weapons 
were often taken from police stations and the armed forces. Dynamite was stolen from mining 
camps in the Peruvian highlands. In one report, 92,000 sticks of dynamite were reported to have 
been stolen (McCormick, 1990). Even so, the rebel group was still poorly armed in comparison 
to the army but this was made up for with ruthlessness as well as the ability to make surprise 
attacks. An example of a surprise attack in Lima occurred in 1982. The Shining Path which often 
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targeted electric power facilities created a two-day blackout which left half of the country’s 
population without electricity. During this time, the Shining Path drove through Lima throwing 
sticks of dynamite. At least fifty public offices were bombed during the first night (McCormick, 
1990). Although lacking in weapons, the Shining Path was able to create fear and wreak havoc in 
Peru.  
In 1987 McCormick wrote that, “Sendero must be singled out for its simple ruthlessness. 
Murder, dynamite bombings and arson are the instruments of political violence. Few terrorist 
groups in modern times, however, have employed high order violence with the same 
determination, lack of discrimination and wide spread effect as the Shining Path” (p. 109).  
According to the Global Terrorism Database there were approximately 5,500 terrorist attacks 
during the civil war in Peru which was coded as starting in March of 1982 and ending in 
September of 1992 (according to the Correlates of War dataset). It is possible that the number of 
attacks was much higher than what was recorded in the database. In 1987, McCormick estimated 
that the Shining Path had carried out as many as 12,000 terrorist attacks. Around this time, 
Guzman, claimed they had carried out approximately 30,000 terrorist attacks (McCormick, 
1987). The Peruvian Ministry of Interior estimated nearly 6,000 terrorist attacks had occurred 
between 1982 and 1985 and the number of attacks were increasing yearly (McCormick, 1987). 
The Shining Path continued to increase the number of regions they had infiltrated in Peru as well 
as the number of terrorist attacks they committed. The high number of terrorist attacks can be 
explained in part by ideology. Degregori (1998) writes, “Sendero’s ideology took violence 
beyond the classic Maoist confines of the people’s war…The militant’s ideological zeal was fed 
constantly by the leadership, particularly by the supreme leader Abimael Guzman, who tended to 
exalt violent purification” (p. 136). He adds, “…Guzman propagated the idea of “the blood 
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quota” that would be necessary for the triumph of the revolution, and warned of the necessity of 
preparing for an inevitable “blood bath” (p. 136).  The Shining Path was also considerably 
weaker than the state and had a weaker military capacity. The government forces were believed 
to have been numbered around 100,000 people while the Shining Path was believed to have less 
than 10,000 rebels (Fielding and Shortland, 2012). Thus, the terrorist attacks carried out by the 
Shining Path were in part due to strong ideology that exalted extreme levels of violence and in 
part due to weak military capacity.  
As the Shining Path continued to expand through the country, the military continued to 
have difficulties in properly countering them. First, the majority, 60 to 70 percent, of the military 
combat units were stationed along the northern and southern frontiers in order to respond to 
potential threats made by Ecuador or Chile (McCormick, 1987).  The military was unprepared to 
“wage an unconventional rural campaign against a poorly armed, elusive opponent” because it 
had “no means of systematically collecting, analyzing and exploiting intelligence on 
Sendero…no corpus of unconventional, small unit tactics; little ability to react quickly to 
guerrilla actions; and chronic problems with sustaining large numbers of forces in the field” 
(McCormick, 1990 p.35 ). In addition, the military did not have the resources it needed. For 
instance, it had few high altitude helicopters that could reach the mountainous, highlands 
regions. In 1990 McCormick wrote, “For institutional and practical reasons, in short, the 
campaign against the Shining Path is not going well. Nor is there any reason to believe that the 
army’s ability to contain and eventually defeat insurgency will improve greatly in the near 
future” (p. 37).  
Peru seemed to be on the verge of national collapse by the beginning of the 1990s. In 
May of 1991 the Shining Path announced that they had reached the “strategic equilibrium” stage 
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of the war which “choked Lima with fear during the next fifteen months” (Stern, 1998, p.4). The 
bombings and the assassinations of political leaders followed by President Fujimori’s self-coup 
in April of 1992 seemed to indicate that the Peruvian government and state would soon collapse 
(Stern, 1998). But, then it was the Shining Path who collapsed. Abimael Guzman was captured 
in September of 1992 which considerably weakened the movement. But, some scholars say that 
in hindsight the Shining Path had actually lost the war earlier (Stern, 1998).  
  It’s suggested the Shining Path had lost the war earlier because the villagers had become 
alienated with the Shining Path so with the assistance of the military they began to form rondas 
campesinas (defense units).  The units were used to defend themselves from the Shining Path 
attacks as well as to show the army that they were not siding with the Shining Path (Stern, 1998). 
Without the support of the villagers and with the formation of the rondas campesinas the Shining 
Path had little chance of winning a revolution which would topple the government. But, it was 
the capturing of the supreme leader, Abimael Guzman, who provided the ideological backbone 
for the movement, which led to the defeat of the Shining Path. While the Shining Path was 
effectively defeated when Guzman was captured, even today there are still factions of the 
Shining Path remaining in Peru and on occasion their actions are still making headlines. 
The Shining Path in Peru is an example of a rebel group with weak military capacity 
initiating and fighting a civil war for control of the government.  As the weak rebel theory 
suggests, a rebel group with weak military capacity such as the Shining Path uses terrorist tactics 
as a way to compensate for the weak military capacity in an attempt to combat the stronger and 
larger government military. Although the military greatly outnumbered the rebels, it was difficult 
for the military to reach the mountainous and later the jungle regions that the Shining Path 
operated in showing that terrain may have played a role in the duration. It was also difficult to 
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target just the Shining Path members since they hid in the mountains, jungles or amongst the 
villagers. The military’s violent counterinsurgency, which killed tens of thousands of people, 
caused many villagers to see the Shining Path as the lesser evil which helped the rebels to win 
some support. This support was not based on the Shining Path’s local policies or tactics, but due 
to the government’s extreme response.  While the rebel group continued to use terror tactics to 
prolong the civil war and maintain their position in parts of the country, the increase in terrorist 
attacks eventually lost the support from villagers.  Thus, while this irregular tactic is a weapon 
for the weak rebel group it is no replacement for institutional development and it is not 
sustainable in the face of a relatively strong central government.    
The case study of Peru is an example of a civil war in which several sufficient factors 
may have played a role in duration. To summarize, the conflict originated in the poorest region 
of the country and most of the actual fighting took place in mountainous and/or forested terrain.  
Also, the conflict shows the ethnic divisions within the society, but it was not an ethnic war; it 
was an ideological war. Contraband also played a role since later in the conflict the Shining Path 
rebels were subsidized by tapping into the illegal coca trade. But, even though all of these factors 
were present one of the key factors to focus on is that in order for the Shining Path to remain a 
threat the group relied heavily on terror attacks since they lacked the economic and military 
capacity to engage in a conventional war against the state. This shows how vital terror attacks 
were in prolonging the duration of the civil war. 
Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, civil war researches have not found one key factor that always relates to 
the duration of civil war. Several sufficient conditions have been suggested and found to relate to 
duration by different scholars, but no necessary condition has been found. It’s important to 
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continue analyzing which factors or variables in civil war may contribute to the duration because 
civil wars continue to wreak havoc on countries. Following in line with past research, this thesis 
also analyzed possible variables that may influence duration including economic factors such as 
per capita income, sociological factors such as ethnic fractionalization, and geographic factors 
such as terrain. No correlation was found with any of the factors that were suggested to relate to 
civil war duration by other researchers such as per capita income, ethnic fractionalization or the 
percentage of mountainous terrain. 
Another factor thought to relate to duration is the strength of the rebel group. As 
mentioned, Buhaug et al. (2009) suggest that conflicts in which rebels have weak military 
capacity tend to last longer. This idea was connected to Mesquita’s (2013) suggestion that weak 
rebel groups will resort to irregular tactics such as terrorism. This weak rebel theory was 
explored in this thesis. In doing so, the fields of civil war research and terrorism research were 
combined. This was possible due to data available through the Global Terrorism Database and 
the Correlates of War.  
The results supported the hypothesis that the duration of civil war relates to the number 
of terrorist attacks. The relationship can be explained as follows. Civil wars that were short in 
duration had few attacks. Civil wars that had a high number of attacks had a long duration. But, 
not all civil wars that had a long duration had a high number of terrorist attacks which means that 
a high number of terrorist attacks is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for a prolonged 
civil war.  
These results are differ from the results found by Thomas (2014) that suggested that a 
greater number of terror attacks in civil war led to more concessions and opportunities to 
negotiate. It is expected that concessions and negotiations will lead to shorter duration. All cases 
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in this thesis with a high number of terror attacks had a long duration of civil war. The difference 
in findings could be due to a difference in how “greater number” and “high number” have been 
defined. The findings could also differ due to her emphasis specifically on Africa whereas my 
research paper focused on all regions, but only on civil wars that were for control of the 
government.  
The results were more in line with Fortna’s (2011) conclusions. She found that civil wars 
last longer when terrorism is involved. She used a different dataset and defined the rebel groups 
as either terrorist or not terrorist, but we both had results that suggest that there is a relationship 
between terror attacks and the duration of civil war.  
This research is limited in that the number of cases is a bit small for a quantitative study. 
Future research may be done that includes more cases and different types of civil war. Since the 
quantitative study was small it only explored correlation. 
Thus, an in-depth case study of Peru was needed in order to reveal some of the causal 
mechanisms.  The Peru case suggests that weak military capacity which in part led the Shining 
Path to commit a high number of terrorist attacks, as well as the combination of terrain, 
contraband, and strong ideology in a poor country with ethnic divisions all contributed to the 
long duration.  The group was so weak that it quite literally stole weapons or used stones as 
weapons. It would seem that such a weak rebel group should be easily defeated. But, the 
overzealous, brute forces that were sent into the highlands to squash the rebels ended up killing 
thousands and committing massive amounts of human rights violations and ultimately were 
unable to overcome the Shining Path. Even with such weak military capacity, the Shining Path 
was able to wage a decade long war that relied heavily on terror attacks. The group was defeated 
not by the military strength of the government, but rather by the capture of their leader.  
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Thus, the key finding is that the quantitative and qualitative data is suggestive (not 
casual) that a high number of terror attacks relates to a long duration of civil war.  The results 
also warrant further research on terror attacks and civil war. The policy implication would be that 
in countries that are experiencing a civil war, if a rebel group is using terror attacks, it may mean 
that the rebel group has a weak military capacity. In such a case, effective intelligence and 
specific, targeted counter-insurgency that is not overzealous or indiscriminate may be a better 
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Figures 5 and 6: Univariate analysis with outliers removed 
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